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Contingency theory, with regard to risk of homeland security incidents and
homeland security preparedness, has received considerable empirical support. In past
research, risk has been measured subjectively as agency executives’ perceived risk of
specific homeland security incidents occurring within their jurisdictions. This study
examines actual risk, using the objective risk factors of experience with past natural
hazards, social vulnerability, and urbanization. These risk factors, used in combination,
have been significantly associated with terrorism-related homeland security incidents in
the United States, and are used in risk assessment models of natural hazards.
Contrary to expectations, the results of this study indicate that objective risk factors
were not associated with either perceived risk or preparedness. Policy implications and
directions for future research are discussed.

i

DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this to my family. My husband deserves special thanks
for taking care of the numerous little day-to-day things, which made the last four months
much easier for me than they could have been. Particular recognition also goes my
father for proof reading this (as well as nearly every paper I have written in the last two
years), although criminal justice is well outside the realm of both his expertise and
interest. I would also like to express my gratitude to my mother, sister, brothers, and
grandmother for their encouragement. The unconditional support and never-ending
patience of my family, not only during the process of completing my thesis, but
throughout all my scholarly pursuits, have meant the world to me. I love you all.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Matthew Giblin, for answering my
endless questions, teaching me structural equation modeling, and providing extensive
feedback on my many drafts. His guidance, assistance, advice, and support have been
invaluable. I would also like to acknowledge the time and energy put forth by my
committee members, Drs. Daryl Kroner and Joseph Schafer. Thank you all for your
support throughout this project.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... i
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ v
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTERS
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction ................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review.......................................................................... 6
CHAPTER 3 – Methodology ............................................................................... 21
CHAPTER 4 – Findings ...................................................................................... 32
CHAPTER 5 – Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................ 40
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 44
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A – Related Sections of the Survey Instrument ............................... 52
VITA

........................................................................................................................... 54

iv

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

Table 1 .......................................................................................................................... 15
Table 2 .......................................................................................................................... 23
Table 3 .......................................................................................................................... 24
Table 4 .......................................................................................................................... 25
Table 5 .......................................................................................................................... 28
Table 6 .......................................................................................................................... 38

v

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1 ........................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2 ........................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 3 ......................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 4 ......................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 5 ......................................................................................................................... 34
Figure 6 ......................................................................................................................... 35
Figure 7 ......................................................................................................................... 37

vi

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the paradigm of policing
expanded to include a homeland security function. Police departments are now
expected to take an unprecedented role as the first line of defense for prevention, as
first responders in the case of incidents, and as a main component of recovery
operations (Homeland Security Council, 2007; Newman & Clarke, 2008; Oliver, 2006).
Research has demonstrated that police agencies have taken a variety of steps to
prepare for homeland security incidents, including updating mutual aid agreements,
creating special units, and participating in homeland security training. One of the best
theories to explain homeland security innovation is contingency theory, which posits that
organizations respond rationally to contingencies in their external environment and
innovate to meet their goals. Applied to homeland security preparedness, police
agencies with higher levels of risk, a key contingency, are more likely to take steps to
enhance their preparedness.
Perceived risk and its impact on behavior is one of the hallmarks of the American
criminal justice system, but it is typically applied at the individual level. For example, as
targeted police patrols or hot spots policing strategies are implemented, offenders are
less likely to commit crimes because they perceive a higher risk of getting caught.
When people are in high-risk situations (e.g., walking alone at night), they are more
likely to take protective measures because they view their risk of victimization to be
elevated. Some studies have applied this logic to organizational-level behavior. As
criminal justice agency heads perceive an elevated risk of a homeland security incident,
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they are more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness. The difference
between the organizational and individual-level studies is the relationship between
perceived risk and behavior. At the organizational level, perceived risk has only been
included as a direct predictor of preparedness, while at the individual level, objective
risk factors indirectly affect behavior through perceived risk.
To date, studies examining organizational-level behavior have not considered
that the effects of external contingencies on preparedness may be indirect through
perceptions of risk. When testing contingency theory, either explicitly or implicitly, past
studies have either combined perceived risk and objective risk factors into a single
variable (Davis et al, 2004), or only examined perceived risk and not considered
objective risk factors (Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010) (see Figure 1). These tactics
may obscure the intricacies of the associations between objective risk factors, perceived
risk, and preparedness, as the relationships may be more complex and multifaceted.
The present study introduces a model of preparedness where objective risk
factors indirectly affect preparedness through risk perceptions (see Figure 2). The
objective risk factors in this study come from a variety of sources guided by different
lines of research. Psychological literature indicates that experience with past hazards
increases the perceived risk of, or rated probability of, future hazard events (Greening,
Dollinger, & Pitz, 1996). Along the same lines, people who are more socially vulnerable
perceive higher victimization risk than those who are less socially vulnerable (Reisig,
Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2009). Additionally, in determining actual risk, researchers and
government organizations use measures of physical vulnerability, or properties of the
built environment that make the area more susceptible to harm (Department of
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Homeland Security, 2009; Ezell, Bennett, von Winterfeldt, Sokolowski, & Collins, 2010).
Objective risk factors include measures of past hazards, social vulnerability, and
urbanization. Respondents from departments located in areas with higher incidence,
prevalence, and magnitude of past natural hazards are expected to rate the probability
of non-terrorism related homeland security incidents as higher when compared to those
with less experience with past hazards. Additionally, departments located in counties
that are more socially vulnerable and more urban should perceive higher risk of
homeland security incidents.
Police chiefs or agency heads of small municipal police departments across the
United States were surveyed and asked questions about their perceived risk of specific
terrorism-related and non-terrorism related homeland security incidents occurring within
the next five years in their jurisdictions. The survey also asked questions about their
levels of preparedness for homeland security incidents. Data from past natural
disasters from the last ten years is utilized, as well as a social vulnerability index and a
rural to urban continuum code indicating the level of urbanization. The relationships
between objective risk factors, perceived risk, and agency preparedness are explored.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Several studies have analyzed the role of police in homeland security efforts.
Results show that police chiefs feel homeland security is the primary mission of the
institution of policing (Stewart & Morris, 2009), and have taken a number of steps to
prepare for homeland security incidents. Departments have written emergency
response plans and trained personnel for homeland security response (Burruss et al.,
2010; Pelfrey, 2007), and have created divisions or units to handle homeland security
threats or incidents (DeLone, 2007; Grillo, 2011). In addition, local police departments
are increasingly relying on state police agencies for training and specialized services
related to homeland security (The Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky
University, 2006). These past studies, by examining the steps law enforcement
agencies have taken to prepare for or prevent homeland security events, demonstrate
that homeland security policing tactics are practiced by departments across the nation.
They also revealed that not all departments are equally prepared, and some
researchers have tried to understand what affects levels of preparedness by applying
contingency theory.
Contingency Theory
Linking the idea that risk influences behavior to organizations, contingency theory
maintains that organizations are dynamic, and rationally adapt to contingencies to
achieve “fit” with their environment. By fitting an organization to contingencies, they
attain effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001). Donaldson’s (2001) structural adaptation to
regain fit (SARFIT) model proposes that when organizations shift out of fit with their
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environment, they change their structure to regain fit. This has been applied to law
enforcement organizations; the structures and activities of an agency are influenced by
contingencies in the external environment (Burruss et al., 2010; Maguire, 2003). In this
case, contingencies would be the objective risk of a homeland security incident. In
policing, it would follow that police departments have rationally responded to an
increased risk of homeland security incidents by taking steps to enhance their homeland
security preparedness.
While contingency theory did not receive much empirical support when applied to
community policing innovations (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010) or the creation of gang
units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002), it has received considerable support in
explaining homeland security preparedness (Burruss et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2004;
Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & Steinberg, 2006; Gerber, Cohen, Cannon, Patterson, &
Stewart, 2005; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009). These past studies have
operationalized risk and preparedness slightly differently, but there are many
similarities. While some did not explicitly use contingency theory in framing the
relationship, perceived risk has been a significant predictor of homeland security
preparedness.
RAND conducted three national waves of a survey on the state of terrorism
preparedness among local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. (Davis et al., 2004;
Davis et al., 2006). Focusing on the second wave, as this measured variables of
interest to the present study, the researchers dichotomized overall risk into two
components – perceived risk and physical vulnerability. Perceived risk was measured
as the perceived likelihood of a terrorist event occurring within their jurisdiction in the
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next five years. The levels of risk reported by metropolitan agencies were no different
than the perceived risk reported by non-metropolitan agencies. Census region was a
significant variable; Southern and Western agencies perceived lower risk than the
Northeastern and Midwestern agencies, which perceived risk as higher. Additionally,
law enforcement agencies with less than 30 officers rated their perceived risk levels as
significantly lower than those agencies with more officers.
In the same study, physical vulnerability was measured by quantifying the
number of different types of structures that were considered potential targets within the
jurisdiction. This group of survey questions asked whether there were particular types
of facilities in the respondent’s jurisdiction (e.g. nuclear power plants, agricultural
facilities, water treatment plants, airports, etc.). This was summed for a scale of 0- 7 of
different types of facilities. Based on responses to the perceived risk and vulnerability
questions, the departments were classified as high, medium, or low-risk. The
researchers determined that higher overall risk was associated with higher levels of
preparedness. Interestingly, vulnerability was the driving factor of overall risk, not
perceived risk (Davis et al., 2004). RAND did a third wave of this survey, but did not
include vulnerability measures. However, researchers found that law enforcement
agency respondents who perceived the risk of a terrorist attack to be higher had
participated in more preparedness activities, and perceived the level of adequacy of
training to be higher (Davis et al., 2006).
Gerber and colleagues (2005) conducted a survey of municipal government
officials, primarily first responders (police, fire, or emergency services department
heads), and examined homeland security preparedness. Preparedness was measured
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using two variables – perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment.
Perceived preparedness was measured by asking the officials to rate their ability to
respond to a terrorist attack, and preparedness commitment was measured by asking
officials to rate their cities’ overall commitment to homeland security preparedness.
While perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment were subjective
measures, the researchers also assessed two objective aspects of preparedness. This
was measured by whether the department had created mutual aid agreements
specifically related to homeland security, and had tested homeland security emergency
response plans (Gerber et al., 2005). Perceived risk was positively and significantly
associated with perceived preparedness and preparedness commitment. Additionally,
large city respondents were more likely to report higher perceptions of preparedness,
preparedness commitment, and preparedness activities. However, perceived risk was
not associated with preparedness activities. This could indicate a direct effect of large
cities on preparedness activities, or this could be due to the study only measuring two
types of preparedness activities (Gerber et al., 2005).
Examining homeland security practices in small agencies across Illinois, Schafer
and colleagues (2009) measured perceived risk as the rated likelihood of a specific
terrorism-related homeland security incident occurring within the jurisdiction within the
next five years. Burruss and colleagues (2010) used the same measure when studying
agencies of all sizes across Illinois. In both these studies, preparedness was the sum of
dichotomous measures of several specified measures to enhance their homeland
security preparedness since the September 11th attacks (Schafer et al., 2009; Burruss
et al., 2010). The results from both studies indicated that an increase in perceived risk
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was positively and significantly associated with preparedness. Agency size was also an
important predictor of preparedness, and the authors ascertained that because larger
agencies are typically found in more urban/metropolitan areas, they may have more
vulnerability than smaller, more rural agencies, in addition to more intergovernmental
complexity, cooperation, and networks (Burruss et al., 2010). While agencies located in
metropolitan areas reported significantly lower risk, there was a direct positive
relationship between metropolitan agencies and preparedness (Schafer et al., 2009).
By examining vulnerability as a separate objective risk measure, this may help explain
the relationship between size and preparedness.
What all of these studies show is that perceived risk is positively associated with
preparedness activities. All of these studies support contingency theory in that
perceived risk (the contingency) is positively associated with preparedness activities
(organizational behavior). However, contingency theory has only been examined using
perceived risk as a proxy measure of actual risk. These two measures of risk,
subjective perception and objective reality, are discrete. While perceived risk is
important, objective risk factors may indirectly affect preparedness through their effect
on perceived risk.
Objective Risk
Calculating objective risk for terrorism-related homeland security incidents
involves the use of the threat vulnerability consequences (TVC) model. This is the
product of threat (the probability of an attack), vulnerability (if it occurs, the probability of
the attack’s success), and consequences (if the attack occurs, the losses that would be
incurred through fatalities, injuries, and economic losses) (Ezell et al., 2007). In this
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model, threat is the most difficult to calculate; it takes into account the goals, motives,
and capabilities of terrorists, as well as factors about possible targets. As opposed to
the actual probability of an event, threat is typically reported as relative likelihood in
comparison to other terrorist events, and is calculated by experts in the intelligence
community (Ezell et al., 2010).
There has been criticism in applying this model to threats posed by intelligent
adversaries – terrorists can adapt to and circumvent protective measures, and use risk
assessment results to plan attacks. Additionally, some scholars argue that this model
only examines individual infrastructure targets but does not consider the
interconnectedness of systems (e.g., electric power grids) (Brown, & Cox, Jr., 2011).
Scholars have recommended that multiple models be used, not TVC exclusively, to
estimate the risk of terrorism attacks (Ezell et al., 2010). In spite of this criticism, the
TVC model is used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the risk of
homeland security incidents, both terrorism-related and non-terrorism related, on
infrastructure (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Within the natural hazards literature, objective risk is calculated using both targetspecific and hazard-specific information. Risk is defined as the combination of the
probability of a hazard occurring, the intensity or impact of the hazard, and the exposure
and vulnerability of the targets (Hollenstein, 2005). The history of hazards in a place is
a salient factor in calculating the probability of reoccurrence (Hufschmidt, Crozier &
Glade, 2005). While the terms may be the same, their meanings differ from the TVC
model. In psychological risk perception, vulnerability describes the potential for harm,
which is equivalent to the consequences variable in the TVC model. Risk, in the
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psychological perspective, would be the probability of something occurring, equivalent
to threat in the TVC model.
How individuals perceive risk is somewhat different than the analytical risk
assessments performed by experts. The perception of risk can be defined as, “the
judgments people make when they are asked to characterize and evaluate” hazards
(Slovic, 1987, p. 280). While risk was once thought to be completely objective, it is now
accepted that risk is actually a subjective judgment and can be influenced by a wide
array of factors, including emotional and affective processes (Slovic, 2000).
A recent article applying this psychometric paradigm to risk perception and
terrorism assessed the relevant literature (Jenkin, 2006). This revealed that while there
are nineteen identified qualitative factors used in the psychometric paradigm, they are
typically reduced to four factors using factor analysis. Dread, unknown risk, the number
of people exposed, and the severity of the consequences are the four factors identified.
Most often, the dread risk factor is the driving force behind overall perceived risk
(Jenkin, 2006). The present study examines the relationship between agency heads’
opinions of probabilities of homeland security events occurring within their jurisdiction
and the objective risk factors of social vulnerability, urbanization, and experience with
past hazards. These objective risk factors correspond with a number of the elements of
the psychometric paradigm identified above.
Hazards.
In the risk assessment field, it has been established that an experience with a
past hazard increases the perceptions of probability of that hazard occurring in the
future. This is due to both availability and affect heuristics. The availability heuristic
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posits that when people experience an event, it is more easily recalled (available),
which increases their future risk perception. The affect heuristic suggests that how
people feel about an event (positive or negative) will impact their risk perceptions.
Positive feelings decrease risk perceptions, and negative feelings increase risk
perceptions. The affect and availability heuristics are closely related, as remembered
events are linked with affect (Keller, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2006). This is supported in
the criminal justice literature, as people who have been victims of crime rate their
perceived risk of future victimizations as higher than those who have not been
victimized (LaGrange, Ferraro, Supancic, 1992). Experience with past hazards would
correspond with both dread and severity of the consequences in the psychometric
paradigm (Jenkin, 2006).
Vulnerability.
Another objective risk factor is vulnerability. Broadly defined, vulnerability is the,
“susceptibility to damage or harm” (Eakin & Luers, 2006, p. 366). While vulnerability is
a term used in multiple scientific disciplines (e.g., geography, economics, earth
sciences, engineering, etc.), it typically has two main themes: the environment and the
people that live there. It is generally agreed upon that vulnerability is made up of three
components: exposure, sensitivity, and response (Cutter & Finch, 2008, Hogan &
Marandola, 2005). However, vulnerability is conceptualized differently across different
disciplines. Depending on the discipline, other components to vulnerability could
include politics, natural resource use and distribution, ecological resilience, and the
absence of entitlements (Adger, 2006; Eakin & Luers, 2006). The vulnerability of
interest in this project is the vulnerability to hazards, whether natural or manmade.
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Cutter (2003) describes vulnerability as, “those circumstances that put people and
places at risk and those conditions that reduce the ability of people and places to
respond to environmental threats” (p. 6).
Social vulnerability measures the potential for harm to a population. While
quantifying social vulnerability is challenging, researchers at the University of South
Carolina have created a social vulnerability index (SoVI) (Hazards & Vulnerability
Research Institute, 2010b). Based on thirty-two variables and seven components (see
Table 1), this index provides a value for each county in the United States. Higher
values are associated with higher levels of social vulnerability. The value itself is
unitless, as it is only for comparison to other counties.
Myriad variables are included in the index based on empirical studies measuring
the influence of the variables on social vulnerability. For example, females have been
shown to have a harder time recovering from disasters. This can be due to women
making less money than their male counterparts, and the typical role of childcare. The
very young, very old, and disabled are more vulnerable because they may be unable to
remove themselves from disasters without assistance. The burden of childcare or
elderly care when facilities are impacted increases vulnerability as well. Ethnicity can
increase social vulnerability to the extent that cultural and language barriers decrease
receipt of post-disaster funding. Socioeconomic variables, such as poverty and
unemployment, indicate the ability to absorb the consequences of disasters and to
bounce back (see Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003 for an extensive description and list of
sources for each concept).
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Table 1.
Social vulnerability index components
Increases or
decreases
social
Component vulnerability

1

2

3

4

5

+

-

Percent
variance
explained

Name

Race (Black),
Class (Poverty)

15.742

Median house value
Median gross rent
Percent of households earning greater than $200,000 annually
Per capita income
Percent Asian
Percent urban population (county, tract levels only)
Population per square mile (block group level only)

12.805

Median age
Percent of households receiving social security
Percent of population under age 5 or over age 65
Percent of population with a disability
Percent urban population (county, tract levels only)
Percent renters
People per unit

7.988

Percent Hispanic
Percent of population without health insurance
Percent employment in extractive industries
Percent female participation in labor force

Gender, Care
Dependence

6.282

Hospitals per capita (county, tract levels only)
Percent of population under age 5 or over age 65
Percent of population 65 and over living in group quarters
Percent female
Percent civilian unemployment
Percent mobile homes

4.837

4.432

Wealth

+

Age

+

Ethnicity
(Hispanic)

+

17.025

Variables
Percent female headed households
Percent poverty
Percent Black
Percent civilian unemployment
Percent of housing units with no car
Percent with less than twelfth grade education
Percent of population with a disability
Percent of children living in married couple families

6

+

Ethnicity
(Native
American)

7

+

Service
Employment
Total

Percent Native American

Percent employment in service industry

69.102

Source: Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2011a
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While the social vulnerability index in this study is place-based, it is interesting to
note that past studies have indicated that individuals who were more socially vulnerable
(measured as socioeconomic and minority status) perceived a higher risk of
victimization (Reisig, et al., 2009). This has been supported in other studies as well;
people who are more socially vulnerable generally report higher risk perceptions than
those who are less socially vulnerable (Kanan & Pruitt, 2002; LaGrange, Ferraro,
Supancic, 1992). This is possibly due to the decreased ability of the socially vulnerable
to recover economically from victimization. According to Reisig and colleagues (2009),
“This dimension weighs heavily on the minds of low-income residents and racial/ethnic
minorities who may be less able to absorb effectively the costs associated with such
losses” (p. 371). While the indirect relationship between social vulnerability and
protective measures has been observed, there may be a direct relationship as well.
Gender and age, variables included in SoVI, have been shown to have direct effects on
some protective measures (Ferraro, 1995). Social vulnerability would correspond with
both dread and severity of consequences in the psychometric paradigm (Jenkin, 2006).
While social vulnerability refers to a population, physical vulnerabilities are the
physical properties of the built environment that make an area more susceptible to
harm. In quantifying the vulnerability of the built environment, researchers have
considered variables assessing residential property, commercial and industrial
development, lifelines, transportation, infrastructure, and monuments/icons (Borden,
Schmidtlein, Emrich, Piegorsch, & Cutter, 2007). Past studies have either created an
index for only particular, predominately large cities (Borden, et al., 2007; Piegorsch,
Cutter, & Hardisty, 2007), examined these factors in a case study for one area of
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interest (Armas, 2008), or asked survey respondents to identify the number of different
types of specific potentially vulnerable targets in their jurisdiction (Davis et al., 2004).
Studies of vulnerability to natural hazards (e.g., flooding due to climate change)
measure exposure as physical vulnerability, or the number of people who could be
impacted (see Brooks, 2003).
Arguably, urban areas have higher property density, more complex infrastructure,
more venues of transportation, and more commercial/industrial development. Urban
cities have disproportionately been targets of terrorism due to “their role as nervecentres of an international economy that puts them at higher risk” (Savitch & Ardashev,
2001, p.2517). Terrorism incidents in urban settings are more frequent, and in turn
have more fatalities, injuries, and physical damages. Researchers contend that
terrorists choose to target urban cities because of their vulnerability (Savitch, &
Ardashev, 2001). Additionally, counties with higher populations will have more people
exposed to potential hazards. In the psychometric paradigm, the physical vulnerability
of an area would correspond to the number of people exposed, dread, and severity of
consequences (Jenkin, 2006). Therefore, an increase in urbanization should be
associated with an increase in perceived risk.
Past criminal justice research has indicated the type of area (rural to urban) has
an impact on protective measures, but only constrained behavior (not defensive
behavior) (Ferraro, 1995). Similar findings have been echoed with regard to law
enforcement agencies. In a study examining small municipal agencies across Illinois,
Schafer and colleagues (2009) determined that rural and urban agencies generally did
not have significant differences in their perceived risk of several different terrorist
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attacks, while agencies located in metropolitan areas generally had lower perceived
risk. However, agencies in metropolitan and urban areas had taken more steps to
prepare for a homeland security incident than agencies in rural areas (Schafer et al.,
2009). Therefore, the relationship between urbanization, perceived risk, and
preparedness is assessed. It is expected that urbanization will indirectly affect
preparedness through its relationship with perceived risk, but it may have a direct effect
as well.
Physical vulnerability and social vulnerability have been studied together in past
research. Borden and colleagues examined the vulnerability of 132 cities in the United
States to environmental hazards. They created indices for socio-economical
vulnerability, built environment vulnerability, and hazard exposure/experience. Adding
all three vulnerability index scores together revealed the vulnerability of the cities in
relation to one another, and indicated that New Orleans was the most vulnerable city in
the United States (Borden et al., 2007).
Piegorsch and colleagues (2007) combined the three indices used by Borden
and colleagues (2007) (social, built environment, and hazard vulnerability) into one
place-based vulnerability index for 132 cities in the United States. Using this
information, and past data on terrorist incidents in the United States, they determined
that the place-based vulnerability index was able to significantly predict both whether a
terrorist incident occurred and whether there were casualties in past terrorist events
(Piegorsch et al., 2007).
Within the hazards literature, social and physical vulnerability has also been
linked to perceived risk. For example, in a study in Romania, people’s awareness of the
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degree of vulnerability of the building in which they lived was positively and significantly
associated with seismic risk perceptions. Additionally, higher levels of social
vulnerability were associated with higher levels of risk perception, but due to study
limitations, they were not able to rule out extraneous factors in the link between social
vulnerability and risk (Armas, 2008).
The Effect of Risk Perceptions on Behavior
At the individual level, studies in criminology have examined the relationship
between perceptions of risk and behavior. In a model introduced by Ferraro (1995),
perceived risk is a predecessor to protective measures. This model has received
empirical support (Reisig et al., 2009). At the organizational level, as previously
discussed, agency respondents’ perceptions of risk are positively associated with
department preparedness.
Most individual-level studies examine the link between past experiences and
protective behaviors through perceived risk. That is, the relationship between
experiences and behavior is indirect. However, experience with past hazards has been
found to have a direct effect on protective behaviors, in addition to an indirect effect
through perceived risk. In a study examining adoption of household hazard
adjustments, researchers determined that past experiences with hazards increased
perceived risk of future hazards, which mitigation adjustments and the purchase of
insurance. Overall, the relationship between past hazards and protective behaviors was
not completely mediated by perceived personal risk of experiencing future hazards, as
experience with past hazards, independent of risk, affected protective measures (Lindell
& Hwang, 2008). Additionally, Ferraro (1995) determined that, independent of
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perceived risk, past victimization was significantly associated with avoidance behaviors
(e.g., avoiding unsafe areas), but not defensive behaviors (e.g., keeping a weapon in
the home). This illustrates that while objective risk factors affect behavior through
perceived risk, there is still a direct effect.
Present Study
Past research has found support for the effect of homeland security risk
perceptions on preparedness. Increased perceived risk of homeland security incidents
is significantly associated with higher levels of preparedness in several studies (Burruss
et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2004, 2006; Gerber, 2005; Schafer et al., 2009). However, this
past research has failed to consider, or has inadequately considered, objective risk
factors. By simply measuring the perceived risk of an incident without considering the
actual risk factors, or contingencies, present in the environment, this may provide an
incomplete picture of the relationship. Individual-level studies have established that risk
perception is an indirect variable between objective risk factors and protective
measures, but objective risk factors also directly impact behaviors. To address the gap
in the organizational-level literature, I propose that objective risk factors will affect
homeland security preparedness both indirectly through perceived risk, as well as
directly (see Figure 2). By using survey data of small municipal agencies, and
combining this with several sources of data outside of the traditional realm of criminal
justice, this study should provide a more thorough understanding of the relationship
between risk and organizational behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Sample
The sample for this project included small municipal law enforcement agencies,
as they are largely understudied in criminal justice research, but represent a majority of
police agencies across the United States. Using the 2004 Census of Law Enforcement
Agencies, agencies with between one and twenty-five full-time officers were selected,
and the overall sampling frame included 9,708 police departments. Because urban
agencies have been shown to be different than rural agencies even after controlling for
size (see Schafer et al., 2009), the sampling frame was stratified along the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s rural-urban continuum. This is a classification scheme that
uses population size, population density, and spatial relationship to other metropolitan
areas. There are nine classifications, ranging from metropolitan counties in
metropolitan areas with a population of one million or more, to completely rural or less
than 2,500 urban population, and not adjacent to a metropolitan area (Economic
Research Service, 2010).
Ninety agencies were randomly selected from each stratification level, for a total
of 810 agencies. Three waves of the survey were mailed out, using the agency address
from the Census of Law Enforcement Agencies. Surveys were addressed to the head
of the agency. This information predominantly came from the National Directory of Law
Enforcement Administrators (National Public Safety Information Bureau, 2011). If the
name of the agency head was not available through this directory, an attempt was made
to find this information online from agencies’ websites (if available), or various other web
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sources. The surveys were sent with a cover letter describing the project, as well as a
pre-paid pre-addressed envelope for the respondent to use to return the completed
survey. Twenty-four surveys were returned as undeliverable with notations from city
personnel or sheriffs’ office personnel reporting that the sampled agency was no longer
in existence. As a result of this, the final sample size was reduced to 786 agencies (see
Table 2). After the survey mailings, the response rate was approximately 38 percent.
An attempt was made to contact each of the non-responding agencies by phone.
As the chief was usually not available, messages were left either on voicemail, with
agency personnel, with city personnel, or others, to remind the chief to complete and
return the survey. An additional copy of the survey was sent to agencies as requested.
At the end of data collection, 350 completed surveys had been returned, for an overall
response rate of 44.5 percent (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics of the sample). To
consider non-response bias, agencies, respondents and non-respondents will be
compared using data from the Census for Law Enforcement Agencies as well as data
from the objective risk factors. Data from this survey was merged with data about past
hazards and the social vulnerability index as described below.
Endogenous Variables
In this study, the final outcome variable is preparedness (see Figure 3).
Preparedness was measured in the law enforcement survey, and agency heads were
asked to indicate whether they had engaged in thirteen specific activities, including
mutual aid agreements, training activities, and risk assessments, among others (see
Table 3). The preparedness variable was summed to create a scale of 0 to 13
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.815).
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Table 2.
Size and region of the country of responding agencies
Number of
agencies

%

1-5 officers

182

52.0

6-10 officers

89

25.4

11-15 officers

39

11.1

16-20 officers

21

6.0

21-25 officers

19

5.4

Total

350

100.0

Northeast

54

15.4

South

114

32.6

Midwest

136

38.9

West

46

13.1

Total

350

100.0

1

38

10.9

2

36

10.3

3

51

14.6

4

40

11.4

5

39

11.1

6

38

10.9

7

38

10.9

8

36

10.3

9

34

9.7

Total

350

100.0

Agency size, 2004

Region of country

Rural-urban continuum code
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Table 3.
Percent of agencies taking steps or activities to enhance homeland security prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery 1

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Public safety agencies operating in or nearby jurisdiction
(including responding agency) use a shared radio network that
achieves interoperability

0.910

0.287

Has in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative agreements
with other law enforcement organizations that cover homeland
security issues

0.790

0.408

Has in place systematic procedures ensuring that homeland
security advisories/emergency notifications are distributed to
appropriate personnel

0.633

0.483

Has a written directive or protocol for contacting the proper
authorities in the event of a homeland security incident or threat
within jurisdiction

0.592

0.492

Part of a regional interagency task force or working group that
functions, in part, to address issues of prevention, preparedness,
response, and/or recovery related to homeland security

0.516

0.500

Has a written response plan outlining preparedness, response,
and/or recovery issues in the event of a homeland securityrelated incident

0.487

0.501

Has in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative agreements
with non-law enforcement agencies such as transit services,
public works, or other governmental agencies that cover
homeland security issues

0.458

0.499

Members of agency trained in homeland security procedures in
past 12 months

0.437

0.497

Members of agency participated in homeland security-focused
field training or table top exercises in past 12 months

0.373

0.484

Completed an inventory of threats or hazards in jurisdiction in
past 12 months

0.329

0.471

Conducted a risk assessment to identify high-risk or high-value
targets or assets within jurisdiction in past 12 months

0.321
2.0%

0.467

Disseminated information to members of the community in an
attempt to increase citizen preparedness in past 12 months

0.262

0.441

Has individual(s) or special unit specifically assigned to address
the homeland security function

0.239

0.427

Type of Step or Activity for Enhancement of Homeland Security 2

1

Each question asked whether or not agencies engaged in these steps or activities. Higher
mean scores indicate higher engagement in steps or activities.
2

n=343
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Perceived risk of terrorism-related and non-terrorism related homeland security
incidents are also endogenous variables. In the law enforcement survey, homeland
security was defined broadly using an all-hazards approach, and included efforts to
protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threats or hazards posed not
only by terrorism but also major disasters/emergencies and catastrophic events that
involve significant casualties and/or substantial destruction of property (e.g., severe
weather, chemical spills, large explosions). This definition was given directly before the
perceived risk questions. Agencies were asked to rate the likelihood, on a scale of 0
(not at all likely) to 10 (very likely), of specific events occurring within their jurisdiction in
the next five years (see Table 4). Perceived risk is measured as a latent construct, and
an assessment of the measurement model is presented in the analysis section.
Table 4.
Perceived likelihood of homeland security incidents occurring within the next five years (mean
scores) 1
Mean
scores

Standard
Deviation

Cyber-terrorism

2.76

2.52

Conventional explosive

2.71

2.35

Chemical

2.42

2.42

Biological

1.95

2.03

Terrorism incident involving military weapons

1.85

2.06

Radiological

1.71

2.03

Severe weather, earthquake, or wildfire

6.46

2.60

Chemical spill or radiological leak

3.98

2.90

Medical pandemic

3.51

2.30

Explosion involving mass casualties

3.11

2.47

Structural failure involving mass casualties

2.59

2.32

Type of Incident
Terrorism-related incident2

Non-terrorism related incident

1

3

Each incident was ranked on a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). Higher scores
reflect a greater perceived likelihood of each incident type occurring.
2

n=344

3

n=348
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Exogenous Variables
Past hazards.
The exogenous variables in this study are the objective risk factors. These
include past hazards, urbanization, and social vulnerability. Utilizing information from
the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United State (SHELDUS), past
hazards were measured using three latent constructs represented by six indicators (a
description of the measurement model is presented in the analysis section).. This
dataset was compiled by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at the
University of South Carolina, and provides county-level data that details information
from eighteen different types of natural hazards.1. For this dataset, these eighteen
types of natural hazards are included if they caused any injury or loss, monetary or
human.
Data from SHELDUS were derived primarily from the monthly Storm Data
publications from the National Climatic Data Center. Additional data sources include
the National Geophysical Data Center, the National Hurricane Center, the Global
Volcanism Program, and the United States Fire Administration, among others. This
analysis includes all events that occurred during the ten year period between 2001 and
2010. The SHELDUS data provides the beginning and end dates of the hazard, the
type of hazard, the location (county and state), the number of injuries, and the number
of fatalities, as well as monetary amounts of property damage and crop damage both in
dollars adjusted and unadjusted to inflation (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute,

1

Types of hazards include avalanche, coastal, drought, earthquake, flooding, fog, hail,
heat, hurricane/tropical storm, landslide, lightning, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado,
tsunami/seiche, volcano, wildfire, wind, winter weather.
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2011b). The first indicator will be the diversity of incidents, measured as how many
different types of the 18 natural hazards occurred from 2001 to 2010. The second
indicator is the total number of natural hazards in each county per year. Following
Borden and colleagues’ (2009) use of this dataset, the magnitude of past hazards were
calculated. The magnitude of damage is measured as the total dollar amount of crop
damage divided by the county’s calculated domestic product, and the total dollar
amount of property damage divided by the county’s calculated domestic product2. As
the final two indicators, the magnitude of injuries and fatalities will be measured as the
calculated rate per 10,000 in the population3. To address problems with skewness and
kurtosis with the hazards variables, the logs of these variables were used (excluding the
diversity of incidents, which did not have these problems) (see Table 5).
Vulnerability.
The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at South Carolina has
developed a Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) that combines thirty-one factors indicating
the level of social vulnerability of all counties across the United States (see Table 1 for a
full list of variables). The primary source of data for the SoVI is the United States

2

Property damage and crop damage, in dollars, were first standardized to 2011 dollars.
To determine the magnitude of the loss specific to each county, the state’s gross
domestic product from 2006 was multiplied by the county’s employment as a proportion
of the state employment from 2006. The resulting dollar amount is estimated as the
county’s domestic product of 2006. The total property damage and total crop damage
for each county was divided by its’ domestic product to determine the magnitude of the
damage as a percent of its’ domestic product (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011).
3

To determine the magnitude of the injuries and fatalities, the total injuries and fatalities
in the time period were divided by the population of the county and multiplied by 10,000
to give the injuries and fatalities per 10,000 people in the population (United States
Census Bureau, 2007).
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Table 5.
Descriptive statistics for hazards variables and normality issues addressed by log transformation

Mean

Original variable
Standard
deviation
Skewness

Logged variable
Kurtosis

Skewness

Kurtosis

Injury rate 1

1.689

4.871

7.631

76.750

1.879

4.005

Fatality rate 1

0.298

0.695

4.584

25.895

2.667

7.987

Incidents per year2

5.827

5.369

5.369

7.918

0.228

2.950

Diversity of incidents 3

6.648

1.659

1.659

0.142

Property damage 4

2.928

12.531

12.531

92.514

2.510

7.505

0.773

3.424

3.424

119.093

3.206

11.039

Crop damage

4

1

Per 10,000 people

2

Total number of incidents divided by 10 years

3

On a scale of 0-18, how many different types out of hazards occurred from
2001-2010
4

As a percent of 2006 county domestic product

Census Bureau, and is based on the years 2005 to 2009. Other data sources include
the American Community Survey, the Geographic Names and Information System, and
the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute,
2011a). Each of the seven components are added together (not weighted) to come up
with the final SoVI value. This is a unitless, comparative scale, so the particular
numbers have no true value. Higher scores indicate higher levels of social vulnerability.
Lacking an appropriate measurement for physical vulnerability, the rural to urban
continuum code was used.
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Control Variable
Past studies have found that agency size has a significant impact on
preparedness activities (see Burruss et al., 2010). Therefore, agency size will be used
as a control variable
Data Analysis
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a category of statistical techniques that
uses a variance-covariance matrix to compare the research model to the data (Gau,
2010). SEM is ideal for the present study, because it allows the use of latent (or
unmeasured) variables in the examination of both direct and indirect effects of the
independent variables. With regression, only the direct relationships can be uncovered.
However, past research has indicated that perceived risk mediates the relationship
between the objective risk factors and preparedness, suggesting that these are indirect
relationships. Additionally, SEM produces fit indices that allow for the comparison and
evaluation of models. SEM also takes into account measurement error (Bryne, 2012;
Gau, 2010). Therefore, SEM is an appropriate analysis plan.
The first step was to use confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate the validity
for the hypothesized latent variables (risk and hazards). Once this is established, both
models’ (direct and indirect) fit indices are compared. The fit statistics that are most
useful for determining the goodness-of fit of the model to the data are the comparative
fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA). Both the CFI and the TLI indicate the model fit improvement
by comparing the hypothesized model to the nested baseline model. CFI values range
from 0 to 1.00, and values above 0.90 or 0.95 are indicative of a good fit. TLI values

30
can exceed 1.00, and values close to 1.00 indicate a good fit (Byrne, 2012). The
RMSEA is an absolute fit index which takes into account the complexity of the model,
and lower values represent an increase in goodness of fit. Values less than 0.05
indicate a good fit, values between 0.08 and 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and values
greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit (Bryne, 2012). An additional fit statistic is the chisquare statistic (Χ2). If this value is significant, this may indicate a poor fit. However,
this statistic is sensitive to sample size, and since the sample size used here is 350, the
other indices will be used to judge the fit of the model. Finally, to compare two models
to one another, these fit statistics, in addition to the Akaike information criterion (AIC),
are used. This also takes into account the complexity of the model, but the value of the
AIC itself is used for comparison only. The model with a lower AIC value fits the data
better than a model with a higher AIC value (Bryne, 2012).
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS

Past research indicates that terrorism risk and non-terrorism risk are discrete
constructs (Giblin, Burruss, & Schafer, in press). The fit statistics for risk as a single
latent factor indicated that this was not a good fit to the data (see Figure 3). In contrast,
when risk of homeland security incidents was broken down to terrorism-related risk
(chemical, biological, radiological, conventional explosive, cyber-terrorism, military
weapons) and non-terrorism related risk (structural failure, severe weather, explosion,
chemical spill/radiological leak, medical pandemic); the model fit the data better (see
Figure 4). In this two-factor model, the fit statistics indicated a good overall fit. The risk
of both terrorism-related and non-terrorism related chemical incidents were correlated
because it is likely that these two types of incidents, whether intentional or otherwise,
are most likely driven by chemicals facilities in the area (Giblin et al., in press).
The hazards model used by Borden and colleagues (2007) and Piegorsch and
colleagues (2007) included two latent factors (injury, death and property losses; number
and diversity of incidents), and one directly observed variables (crop damage).
However, this produced poor model fit statistics (see Figure 5). This could be samplespecific, as both previous studies used large cities only, while the sample used in this
study includes both rural and urban counties.
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Using exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation, the six variables
measuring hazards loaded onto three factors: monetary losses (property and crop
damage in dollars), human casualties (rate of injuries or deaths), and number and
diversity of incidents. The models did not fit the data when one and two factors were
used, but with three factors, the fit statistics indicated that this model approaches a
good fit. The factor measuring the number and diversity of incidents is correlated with
both human casualties and monetary damage, because those areas with more incidents
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and types of incidents will most likely have greater damage. The factor loading scores
and fit statistics are presented in Figure 6.

To test the hypothesized model, the structural model was entered into Mplus with
the indirect paths identified. The curved dotted lines represent correlations. Based on
the modification indices in Mplus, as well as past research (Burruss et al., 2010; Giblin
et al., in press), terrorism and non-terrorism related risk were correlated. Additionally,
the social vulnerability index was correlated with human casualties, as more socially
vulnerable areas have higher potential for harm to people. The SoVI was also
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correlated with urbanization, because several of the variables that comprise the index
would be more likely in an urban area. The fit statistics indicated the model approached
a good fit; however, no objective risk factor was significantly associated with perceived
risk or preparedness (see Figure 7). Perceived risk of a terrorism-related homeland
security incident was the only variable significantly associated with preparedness, and
none of the indirect models identified were significant (see Table 6).4
The R2 for this model indicates that only 0.7 percent of the variation in terrorismrelated risk and 1.9 percent of the variation in non-terrorism risk are explained. In other
words, over 98 percent of the variation in perceived risk is explained by factors not
included in this model. The model explains 13.7 percent of the variation in homeland
security preparedness.

4

A model with only direct paths to preparedness was also tested. The results were not
significantly different from the model with both direct and indirect paths. The only
significant predictors of preparedness were terrorism-related risk and agency size.
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Table 6.
Results of a structural model predicting preparedness, including both direct and indirect paths

Terrorismrelated risk
β

Non-terrorism
related risk
β

Preparedness
β

-0.027

-0.075

0.063

0.121

Direct effects
Hazards
Monetary losses
Human casualities
Number and diversity of events

0.013
0.013

0.076

-0.075

-0.055

-0.069

Urbanization

-0.059

0.076

0.045

Agency size

0.053

0.084

0.119*

Social vulnerability

Terrorism-related risk

0.183*

Non-terrorism related risk

0.093

Indirect effects via terrorism-related risk
Social vulnerability

0.003

Urbanization

-0.014

Agency size

0.005

Indirect effects via non-terrorism related risk
Social vulnerability

-0.007

Urbanization

0.009

Agency size

0.004

Monetary damage

-0.016

Human damage

0.037

Number and diversity of events

0.041

R2
*p<0.05

0.007

0.019

0.137
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The connection between perceived risk of homeland security incidents and
homeland security preparedness has received considerable support in policing
literature. From a contingency theory perspective, organizations rationally respond to
risks in their external environments by taking steps to prepare for homeland security
incidents. However, contrary to expectations, perceptions of risk and objective risk
factors of homeland security incidents were not significantly associated in this study.
When assessing actual risk for terrorist incidents and natural hazards,
researchers and government organizations consider objective risk factors such as the
vulnerability of the place and the population. Within the psychological literature, these
factors, in addition to experience with past hazards, shape perceptions of risk. In the
present study, the objective risk factors of social vulnerability, experience with past
hazards, and urbanization not only do not impact risk perceptions, but they also are not
associated with preparedness measures. In other words, the homeland security
preparedness levels of agencies are not influenced by the actual risk of those agencies’
jurisdictions. Regardless of the statistical significance, within the sample the objective
risk factors only explained less than two percent of the variation in perceived risk.
Interestingly, while preparedness is not directly or indirectly influenced by
objective risk factors, it is significantly associated with perceived risk. Agency leaders
who perceive their risk to be higher, independent of the actual risk of the jurisdiction, are
more likely to take steps to enhance their preparedness. Therefore, this study provides
mixed support for contingency theory. While perceived risk influences preparedness,
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objective risk factors do not. These results indicate that either the measures of
objective risk used in this study are flawed (i.e., they may not be the most relevant risk
factors to small municipal police agencies), or something other than these objective risk
factors impact agency respondents’ perceptions of risk. These could be individual-level
characteristics of the respondents not captured in this survey, such as gender, race,
and age. This would mean that the responses depend on the member of the
organization that responded to the survey. To test whether individual-level
characteristics are influencing perceived organizational-level risk, future studies should
consider whether perceived risk is consistent across the department. This type of
study, when analyzed with objective risk factors, could determine not only if specified
objective risk factors are associated with perceived risk, what personal characteristics
are related to perceived risk.
Policy Implications
Homeland security has become an important aspect of policing in recent years,
and there has been considerable funding allocated to this new function. However, this
study indicates that those departments that are the most prepared may not be the most
at risk. Whether using grants or local department funds, departments may not be using
their resources wisely, as funds allocated to preparedness may be better used
elsewhere in departments with low risk. The databases used in this study are publicly
available, and could be utilized at the national-level to determine which jurisdictions are
the most at-risk or are the most vulnerable to homeland security incidents. The
Department of Homeland Security could target those departments to make them aware
of their elevated risk levels and the availability of funding.
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Limitations
This study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research.
All measures of objective risk factors (hazards, social vulnerability, and urbanization)
are at the county-level, while the agency respondents were surveyed on the risk of
incidents occurring within their jurisdiction. Using the risk factors for specific
jurisdictions would have been preferable, but data at this level were not available.
Using the rural to urban continuum code instead of actual measures of physical
vulnerability may not be a precise measurement of the actual physical vulnerability for a
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, there is not a database available that assesses physical
vulnerability (like the social vulnerability database). Future researchers, guided by past
studies, should include true measures of physical vulnerability.
The measures for past natural hazards were combined over the past ten years.
Some of the agency respondents may not have lived in the same area so may not have
personally experienced these hazards. However, as long as the agency executive had
lived in the area and experienced the past hazards, research has indicated that even six
years after a hurricane, residents of cities who were exposed to the hurricane rated their
risk of experiencing any natural disaster as higher in a control city that did not
experience the hurricane (Norris, Smith, & Kaniasty, 1999). Additionally, up to seven
years after a fatal lightning storm, adolescents who went to school with a child who was
killed still rated their perceived risk of encountering another fatal natural disaster as
higher than those who did not (Greening et al., 1996). However, future studies should
collect data on the respondents’ history with the department to rule out this possible
limitation.
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Additionally, some hazards may have occurred in neighboring counties which the
department may have assisted with. Research has indicated that, while not as strong of
a predictor as personal victimization, indirect or vicarious victimization has a significant
association with perceived risk (Ferraro, 1995). Furthermore, events that occurred last
year may be more influential than hazards that occurred nine years ago. For a more
accurate picture of the effect of past hazards, using spatial and temporal factors would
be ideal.
While the social vulnerability index used is from the years 2005-2009, and our
survey was mailed in 2011, it has been shown to be relatively stable over time. From
1960 to 2000, only 484 out of 3141 counties (15.4%) in the United States had a
statistically significant change in their social vulnerability. This was mostly due to an
increase or decrease in population size or density (Cutter & Finch, 2008).
Weinstein and Nicolich (1993) criticized much past research examining the
correlation between risk perception and behaviors. They noted that, in order to be
accurate, these types of studies must be done longitudinally as the relationship between
risk and behavior is bidirectional. While this may be true of certain health protective
behaviors (the example used in their article was risk of contracting AIDS – by taking
protective measures, people could reduce their risk), this weakness does not apply to
studies examining homeland security preparedness. While it may be possible to
mitigate the damage incurred by future homeland security incidents, simply enhancing
preparedness to respond to a homeland security incident does not decrease the risk
that an incident could occur (Weinstein & Nicolich, 1993).
Directions for Future Research
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Regardless of these limitations, this study is an important contribution because it
indicates that small departments’ preparedness levels are not associated with the actual
risk factors within the counties in which they are located. This finding is contrary to
expectations based on past research at the individual-level and in other fields. While
perceived risk predicts preparedness, the objective risk factors used in this study are
not associated with either perceived risk or preparedness. Future research should
focus on determining whether department risk is consistent among all levels of the
organization, what factors actually influence perceived risk, and the viability of the
model in larger agencies.
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APPENDIX A
Related Sections of the Survey Instrument
Survey questions address homeland security, defined broadly to include efforts to protect against, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from threats and hazards posed not only by terrorism but also major disasters/emergencies and catastrophic
events that involve significant casualties and/or substantial destruction of property (e.g., severe weather, chemical spills, large
explosions). Please keep this broad all-hazards definition in mind when answering the following questions unless directed
otherwise.
1.
How would you rate the likelihood of the following types of terrorism-related and non-terrorism homeland
security incidents occurring within your jurisdiction in the next five (5) years? Evaluate each possible incident on
a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely).
Not at
all likely
The following terrorism-related
homeland security incidents?

Very
likely

(0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1a.

Chemical incident

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1b.

Biological incident (e.g.,
anthrax, contamination of
water/food supply)

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1c.

Radiological incident

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1d.

Conventional explosive
incident

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1e.

Cyber-terrorism

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1f.

Terrorism incident involving
military weapons

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Not at
all likely
The following non-terrorism
homeland security incidents?

Very
likely

(0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1g.

Structural failure involving
mass casualties

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1h.

Severe weather (e.g.,
tornado, flood, mudslide,
hurricane), earthquake, or
wildfire

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1i.

Explosion involving mass
casualties

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1j.

Chemical spill or radiological
leak (e.g., derailed train,
nuclear power plant)

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

1k.

Medical pandemic (e.g.,
avian flu, small pox)

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O
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2.

Agencies may take a variety of steps to enhance homeland security prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery. Please indicate whether your agency engages in any of the following activities or steps. Remember,
homeland security is defined broadly to include both terrorism-related threats and major non-terrorism
disasters or emergencies.
Yes
No
2a.

Does your agency have an individual(s) or special unit specifically assigned to
address the homeland security function?

O

O

2b.

Is your organization part of a regional interagency task force or working group
that functions, in part, to address issues of prevention, preparedness,
response, and/or recovery related to homeland security?

O

O

2c.

Within the past 12 months, have any members of your agency been trained in
homeland security procedures?

O

O

2d.

Within the past 12 months, have members of your agency participated in
homeland security-focused field training or table top exercises?

O

O

2e.

Does your agency have in place systematic procedures ensuring that
homeland security advisories/emergency notifications are distributed to
appropriate personnel?

O

O

2f.

Does your agency have a written directive or protocol for contacting the
proper authorities in the event of a homeland security incident or threat
within your jurisdiction?

O

O

2g.

Within the past 12 months, has your agency completed an inventory of
threats or hazards in your jurisdiction?

O

O

2h.

Within the past 12 months, has your agency conducted a risk assessment to
identify high-risk or high-value targets or assets within your jurisdiction?

O

O

2i.

Does your agency have a written response plan outlining preparedness,
response, and/or recovery issues in the event of a homeland security-related
incident?

O

O

2j.

Does your organization have in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative
agreements with other law enforcement organizations that cover homeland
security issues?

O

O

2k.

Does your organization have in place one or more mutual aid or cooperative
agreements with non-law enforcement agencies such as transit services,
public works, or other governmental agencies that cover homeland security
issues?

O

O

2l.

Do the public safety agencies operating in or nearby your jurisdiction
(including your agency) use a shared radio network that achieves
interoperability?

O

O

2m.

Within the past 12 months, has your agency disseminated information to
members of the community in an attempt to increase citizen preparedness?

O

O
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